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REAL PROPERTY
RALPH E. BOYER* ROBERT L. JAMERSON, JR.** AND JEFFREY R.
SURLAS***
The authors explore recent developments in Florida Real
Property Law. Topics discussed include vendor and purchaser,
estates and related interests, mortgages, mechanics' liens, land-
lord and tenant, condominiums, water law, and eminent domain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The format of this survey' is similar to that of the preceding two.
Once again, the scope will be narrowed to a relatively small number
of cases and recent significant legislation. The authors have at-
tempted to focus only on those cases which in some way change or
clarify established principles of law. Other sources' are available for
those wishing to consult a compendium of all decisions and legisla-
tion covering the subject matter during the survey period.
II. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Abstracts of Title
Since the common law liability of abstractors for errors or omis-
sions is governed by contract principles, liability is limited to those
in privity of contract. 3 Although the principal Florida case, Sickler
v. Indian River Absract & Guaranty Co.,4 has followed the privity
rule, that concept has been liberalized somewhat in Chelsea Title
1. This survey covers volumes 311 through 337 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series,
and legislation in 1975 and 1976 Florida Laws.
2. See, e.g., R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1976).
3. See 1 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 4.05[4], at 29 (Dec. 1976 Supp.).
4, 195 So. 195 (Fla. 1940).
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& Guaranty Co. v. Louis Briggs Construction, Inc.5 In the latter case
the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that where a pur-
chaser had picked up and paid the fee for the abstract, he was in
privity with the abstractor and could hold it liable for defects, even
though the vendor had ordered the abgtract and reimbursed the
purchaser.'
B. Sales Regulation-Real Estate License Law
Florida Statutes section 475.01(2) (1975) defines those required
to be licensed as real estate brokers. The statute exempts, inter alia,
corporate presidents from the licensing requirements if they are
engaged in the sale of corporate property, unless the corporation is
otherwise classified as a real estate broker or salesman.
In Florida Real Estate Commission v. McGregor7 the defendant
corporation financed the purchase of homes by buying the receiv-
ables (note and mortgage) from a particular corporate vendor,
which sold and built homes on its buyers' real estate. In the course
of its business, the defendant sometimes obtained title to real pro-
perty by foreclosure or by deed in lieu of foreclosure. It did not
utilize registered real estate brokers to sell any of its repossessed
homes. Brokers had been unwilling to handle this type of property
because of its location and the small commissions available. There-
fore, the corporation employed field representatives who devoted
approximately fifteen percent of their time to finding purchasers for
the properties. These representatives were neither corporate officers
nor registered Florida real estate brokers, and they received no
bonus or commission for their procurement efforts.
Seeking an injunction against the corporation and its mortgage
representatives, the Florida Real Estate Commission filed a com-
plaint alleging that the defendants were violating the Florida Real
Estate License Law' by selling the repossessed property without a
Florida real estate license. The trial court held that Florida Statutes
section 475.01(2) (1975) was unconstitutional as applied to the de-
5. 315 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
6. In reaching its decision, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether Moyer v.
Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973), overruled the Sickler case. Moyer held that "a third party
general contractor, who may foreseeably be injured or sustained an economic loss proximately
caused by the negligent performance of contractual duty of an architect, has a cause of action
against the . . . negligent architect, notwithstanding absence of privity." Id. at 402.
7. 336 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1976).
8. FLA. STAT. ch. 475 (1975).
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fendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, hold-
ing that the statute denied the corporation and its employees equal
protection The court found the licensing exemption for corporate
presidents to be arbitrary since there was no "logical connection
between the classification involved and the stated purpose . . . of
protecting members of the general public who are involved in real
estate transactions."'"
C. Covenants for Title: Encumbrances Versus Cloudg on Title
The covenant against encumbrances is considered to be a pres-
ent covenant and is breached immediately, if at all, upon delivery
of the deed." The covenant is an assurance that there are no en-
cumbrances outstanding against the premises. In Florida, as else-
where, an encumbrance generally is defined as "every right to or
interest in the land, which may subsist in a third party, to the
diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing
of the fee by the conveyance."'"
In Boulware v. Mayfield 3 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, dealt with a case of first impression involving the question
of whether a mortgage, satisfied in fact but unsatisfied on the public
record, thereby constituting a cloud on title, violates the covenant
against encumbrances in a Florida statutory warranty deed. The
purchasers had brought an action to cancel a mortgage and to re-
cover costs of that suit from the vendor for alleged violation of the
covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the purchasers with
respect to the suit to cancel title and in favor of the vendor with
respect to the breach of covenant action. After noting that the pur-
chasers were successful in cancelling the mortgage and that no en-
cumbrance existed, the First District held that there is no cause of
action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances where the
alleged encumbrance is invalid and unenforceable. The court re-
jected the plaintiffs' contention that the common law covenant
9. 336 So. 2d at 1160 n.5. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute violated
article 1, section 2, of the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution's four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause.
10. 336 So.2d at 1159.
11. Gore v. General Properties Corp., 149 Fla 690, 6 So. 2d 837 (1942). See generally 1
R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 15.08[1].
12. Gore v. General Properties Corp., 149 Fla. at 696, 6 So. 2d at 839-40.
13. 317 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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against encumbrances warrants to the purchaser a record title even
though such record encumbrance is-invalid and unenforceable:
In short, [plaintiffs'] complaint is lodged because of a cloud on
the record title, not that the grantor has breached her common
law covenant against encumbrances. The distinction between an
encumbrance and a cloud on a title for property has been deline-
ated for many years. To be a cloud upon a record title, the claim
may be invalid, while only lawful or valid claims violate the
covenants as to encumbrances."
D. Reformation: Patent-Latent Ambiguity
In Mathews v. Florida Crossbreeds, Inc. 5 a lessee of farmland
brought an action against the lessor for specific performance of an
option to purchase provision within the lease. The lessee also sought
reformation because the legal description within the lease of a parcel
of land failed to close when charted on a map. In considering
whether it could properly go outside the lease agreement to supply
a description for such a reformation, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, noted that although the rule differentiating be-
tween patent and latent ambiguities with respect to the admission
of parol evidence has been criticized and even discarded in some
jurisdictions, the Florida courts have continued to recognize the
proposition that parol evidence cannot be introduced to explain a
patent ambiguity." Finding the legal description within the lease to
be patently ambiguous, the court, in an apparent effort to circum-
vent the patent-latent distinction, held that neither party had in-
tended the parcel to be described in the manner set forth within the
lease, and thus on the ground of a mutual mistake, affirmed a judg-
ment granting reformation and specific performance.
The court attempted to distinguish Connelly v. Smith, 7 in
which the District Court of Appeal, Third District, refused to reform
a patently ambiguous deed description and denied the introduction
of parol evidence. However, the Mathews and Connelly decisions
appear to be conflicting. While the Mathews court did not openly
reject the patent-latent distinction, as is the trend in other jurisdic-
14. Id. at 472.
15. 330 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
16. Carson v. Palmer, 139 Fla. 570, 190 So. 720 (1939); Landis v. Mears, 329 So. 2d 323
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). See generally R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 13.06[1].
17. 97 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
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tions,'" it appears to have done so in an indirect manner. The Sec-
ond District's use of mutual mistake as a basis for reformation
would seem to allow the court to consider parol evidence any time
an instrument contained an ambiguous legal description of land, for
it is unlikely that the parties would ever "intend" to describe a
parcel of land inaccurately within a legal document.
E. Documentary Stamp Tax and Surtax
Florida Statutes section 201.17(2) (1975) requires the payment
of a penalty, equal to the payment due, anytime a document, instru-
ment, or paper upon which a tax is imposed does not bear the proper
value of stamps upon audit or at the time of recordation. In
Dominion Land & Title Corp. v. Department of Revenue'" the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that this penalty provision was neither
so harsh as to constitute a denial of due process, nor an excessive
fine under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution.
In Florida Department of Revenue v. DeMaria° the District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that a deed by which a corpora-
tion transferred real estate to its sole stockholder, subject to an
outstanding mortgage which the stockholder paid but did not as-
sume, was not taxable under Florida Statutes section 201.02 (1973).
This statute imposes a tax in an amount determined by the consid-
eration paid on deeds and other instruments whereby realty is con-
veyed to a purchaser. The supreme court subsequently reversed'
the First District, holding that the shifting of the economic burden
was sufficient consideration to make the taxpayer a purchaser
within the meaning of the statute."
In Department of Revenue v. Brookwood Associates, Ltd.2" a
purchaser of realty gave the seller a mortgage which included the
balance owed by the seller on an earlier mortgage. The obligation
18. See, e.g., Crisp County v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 73 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1934); Stoffel
v. Stoffel, 241 Iowa 427, 41 N.W.2d 16 (1950); Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md. 240, 181
A. 353 (1935); Haupt v. Michaelis, 231 S.W. 706 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
19. 320 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1975).
20. 321 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975), rev'd, 338 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
21. 338 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
22. For a further discussion of the development of Florida law on this point, see Brill &
Hayes, Developments in Florida State and Local Taxation: 1975-1976, 31 U. MIAMI L. R v.
__ (1977).
23. 324 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
24. This is commonly called a "wrap-around mortgage." It enables the purchaser to
[Vol. 31:1183
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on the first mortgage was not assumed by the purchasers, but re-
mained with the seller. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
held that the "'amount' [of the first mortgage], for the purposes
of the surtax, shall not be included in the 'consideration paid' on
which the tax is computed." 5
F. Agreement for Deed
The trend in Florida cases has been to construe agreements for
deed as equivalent or similar to mortgage agreements." Continuing
this trend in State ex rel. Four-Fifty Two-Thirty Corp. v.
Dickinson,27 the supreme court held that agreements for deed exe-
cuted in connection with the sale of real property are taxable under
Florida Statutes section 199.032(2) (Supp. 1976) as intangible prop-
erty secured by mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien upon real
property. The court further held that the nonrecurring two-mill tax
is due when the agreements for deed are recorded or sought to be.
enforced pursuant to Florida Statutes section 199.042(2) (1975),
while the recurring annual tax of Florida Statutes section 199.032(1)
(Supp. 1976) is inapplicable. In reaching its decision, the court
found that the nature of the transaction was not changed even
though the agreement, providing for no personal liability on behalf
of the purchaser, limited the vendor's remedy to recapture of the
land and retention of payments.
G. Rights of Creditors
Although the doctrine of equitable conversion has been applied
for some purposes to land contracts, it had been held inapplicable
to enforce creditors' claims against either vendor or purchaser.
make single payments to the seller for its entire indebtedness with the seller transmitting
payments to the holder of the first mortgage.
25. 324 So. 2d at 187, quoting the trial court.
26. See, e.g., Torcise v. Perez, 319 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975) (held that where
contracts for deed were intended to secure payment of money, they are deemed to be mort-
gages, thus entitling purchasers to possession and use of the property prior to making all of
the installment payments); Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975) (held that
an agreement for deed is essentially a security device intended to take the place of a purchase
money mortgage); Zeigler v. Hawkins, 315 So. 2d 200 (Fla. lst Dist. 1975) (held that an action
to vacate a contract for deed should have been considered as a mortgage foreclosure). See
also Part IV, Section A, infra.
27. 322 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1975). See also Department of Revenue v. GAC Properties, Inc.,
324 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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Thus, a vendor's creditors had been permitted to make an ordinary
levy and execution sale against his legal title.28 A vendee's creditors,
on the other hand, had to resort to equitable proceedings to attach
his interest in the land contract." The continued general viability
of this distinction recently has been put in doubt.3 0 Furthermore, a
mortgagor's "equity of redemption" has been made specifically at-
tachable by legal execution pursuant to Florida Statutes section
56.061 (1975)."1
In Hoffman v. Semet32 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that a vendee in possession under an agreement for
deed, after default and before relinquishing possession to the ven-
dor, also has an equity of redemption within the meaning of section
56.061, thereby making his interest subject to levy and execution
upon a judgment at law. The court noted that while the term
"equity of redemption" has reference to a mortgagor's interest in
land, it is equally appropriate to apply the term to a vendee's inter-
est under a contract for deed in view of the Florida courts' construc-
tion of that instrument as a mere mortgage agreement.
H. Damages
In the absence of controlling provisions in the sales contract,
the most common remedy for a breach by either vendor or purchaser
is an action for damages.3 While the general measure of damages
for a nondefaulting vendor is either the loss of the bargain or the
difference between the agreed purchase price and the actual value
of the property at the time of the breach less the amount paid,34 the
amount of damages recoverable by a vendee may also depend upon
the good or bad faith of the breaching vendor.35 If the breach is not
occasioned by bad faith, the proper measure of damages is the re-
covery of any purchase money paid with interest and the expenses
of title investigation, as well as any profit made by the vendor as a
28. Latin-Am. Bank v. Rogers, 87 Fla. 147, 99 So. 546 (1924).
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, 145 So. 177 (1932).
30. Arko Enterprises, Inc. v. Wood, 185 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) (dicta). The Arko
court stated that a vendee's interest is "subject to sale on execution." Id. at 737.
31. See 1 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 75 n.11.
32. 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
33. See generally 1 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 4.07[6].
34. Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So. 2d 538 (1948), overruled on other grounds,
Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1972).
35. Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1958).
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result of the subsequent sale. Where the breach involves bad faith,
the vendor is liable for the value of the land at the time of the breach
with interest from that date.3"
Seeking not only compensatory damages, as delineated by the
above general rules, but punitive damages as well, the vendee in
American International Land Corp. v. Hanna7 brought an action
against a vendor for the alleged breach of an installment land sale
contract. The vendee had paid in full for two lots of alleged water-
front land and pursuant to the terms of the contract was entitled to
a deed. Instead of providing a deed, the vendor offered to exchange
two other lots in the same subdivision for the vendee's lots. At the
time of the offer, the vendor had begun construction of a golf course
on the lots of the vendee without the latter's knowledge. The vendee
refused the exchange offer and filed suit when the vendor persisted
in his refusal to issue a deed.
The trial court limited the vendee's recovery to compensatory
damages. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed"
and allowed punitive damages because the vendee's complaint al-
leged a bad faith breach of contract plus the independent tort of an
intentional, willful, and irrevocable conversion of the property by
the vendor. The Second District relied on the rationale of Griffith
v. Shamrock Village, Inc.,39 wherein the Supreme Court of Florida
had said:
The general rule is that punitive damages are not recoverable for
breach of contract, irrespective of the motive of defendant. But
where the acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to
a cause of action in tort there may be a recovery of exemplary
damages upon proper allegations and proof. In order to permit a
recovery, however, the breach must be attended by some inten-
tional wrong, insult, abuse or gross negligence which amounts to
an independent tort.4"
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the Second District's
reasoning and reinstated the trial court's order limiting recovery to
compensatory damages. After stating its approval of the rule of law
36. Id.; Key v. Alexander, 91 Fla. 975, 108 So. 883 (1926).
37. 323 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1975).
38. Hanna v. American Int'l Land Corp., 289 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
39. 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957).
40. 289 So. 2d at 758, quoting Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla.
1957).
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articulated in Associated Heavy Equipment Schools, Inc. v.
Masiello,4' that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of
contract, the supreme court pointed out that real property cannot
be the subject of conversion. Treating the appellate court's finding
of "conversion" as an assertion that the complaint alleged the tort
of fraud and deceit, the court held that the vendor's exchange offer
did not constitute a false representation and that the vendee did not
rely upon a false representation to his injury when he refused the
offer. Thus, the breach of contract was held not to constitute tor-
tious fraud and deceit, and the vendee was not entitled to punitive
damages. While noting that it did not disagree with the Griffith
case, the court stated the general rule that a breach of contract
cannot be converted into a tort merely by allegations of malice.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Atkins argued that the
complaint sufficiently alleged an independent tort. He pointed out
that even if the construction of a golf course on the vendee's prop-
erty, without his knowledge or consent, and the refusal to deliver the
deed did not meet the requirements of pleading an independent
tort, the misrepresentation that the vendee's property consisted of
waterfront lots did.
I. Legislation
The state legislature amended sections 177.07142 and 177.11113
of the Florida Statutes in 1976 to clarify which governing body has
jurisdiction to approve plats. As amended, the statutes provide:
Where a plat to be submitted for approval is located wholly within
the boundaries of a municipality, the municipality has exclusive
jurisdiction to approve the plat; where the plat lies wholly within
the unincorporated areas of a county, the governing body of the
county has exclusive jurisdiction; and where a plat lies within the
boundaries of more than one governing body, two plats are to be
prepared and each governing body has exclusive jurisdiction to ap-
prove the plat within its boundaries." Any provision within a county
charter which is inconsistent with the foregoing statutory provisions
prevails to the extent of the inconsistency. 5
41. 219 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
42. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-110 (codified at FLA. STAT § 177.071 (Supp. 1976)).
43. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-110 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 177.111 (Supp. 1976)).
44. FLA. STAT. § 177.071 (Supp. 1976).
45. Id.
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The legislature also created section 177.132,46 which provides
for the recording with the clerks of the circuit courts certain other-
wise unrecorded maps and plats for informational purposes only.
III. ESTATES AND RELATED INTERESTS
A. Dower
Although Florida abolished inchoate dower in 1973,11 and in
1975 provided that the surviving spouse, regardless of sex, is entitled
to an "elective share,"4 litigation still exists with respect to the laws
in effect prior to October 1, 1973, which allowed the wife, but not
the husband, dower. 9 The Supreme Court of Florida recently held
in In re Estate of Rincon ° that the distinction between treatment
of the sexes under the 1973 law was constitutional.
In Rincon, a widower sought to take dower under the 1973 law
although the administration of his deceased wife's estate began
prior to the effective date5' of the act. In reviewing the circuit court's
denial of the election, the supreme court found the discrimination
between treatment of the sexes "reasonably justified by the dispar-
ity between their economic capabilities."52 Therefore, the court held
it did not violate the equal protection clause of either the federal or
state constitution. The court noted that the 1968 Florida Constitu-
tion provided that "dower or curtesy may be . . . regulated by
law,"53 and as such, vested authority in the legislature to distinguish
between a husband and wife regarding property rights in their de-
ceased spouses.
B. Concurrent Estates
The rule is well settled that cotenant spouses may not unilater-
ally convey their interests in an estate by the entireties to a third
46. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-110 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 177.132 (Supp. 1976)).
47. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-107, § 1 & ch. 73-106, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34-.35
(1975)).
48. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-220, § 13 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (1975)).
49. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34-.35 (1971)(amended, 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-107, §1 & ch. 73-
106, §1; repealed 1974).
50. 327 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1976).
51. The deceased wife died in March 1973, and the amended law became effective Octo-
ber 1, 1973.
52. 327 So.2d at 226, citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
53. FLA. CONST. art. V, §10.
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party. 4 In MacGregor v. MacGregor"' the wife, without joinder of
her husband, executed a quitclaim deed of entireties property to a
grantee. Six weeks later, the husband, without joinder of his wife,
quitclaimed the same property to the same grantee. The court found
that neither deed adversely affected the interests of the other
spouse. Since the husband's subsequent deed amounted to his as-
sent to his wife's conveyance, the deeds effected a valid transfer of
the entireties property to the grantee. Therefore, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the trial court's determination
that the transfers did not convey title to the grantee and remanded
the case to determine whether the separate deeds were intended to
create a security interest only.
C. Homestead
1. CASE LAW
Although individual spouses may not transfer property held by
the entireties to a third person without joining in such conveyance, "
pursuant to statute," either may convey his or her interest in their
homestead to the other without joinder in the deed. However, the
strict requirements for conveyance in Florida Statutes section
689.01 (1975) are applicable to such transfers.
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Williams v. Foerster8
that the statute which eliminated the necessity of joinder of the
other spouse in conveying the homestead by one spouse to the other
was constitutional and did not conflict with the state constitutional
requirement that necessitates joinder of both spouses for alienation
of the homestead." The court invalidated the transfer in that case,
however, on the ground that only one witness signed the deed in
contravention of the statute requiring two witnesses."0
The dissent suggested that the contract of conveyance should
be upheld on an estoppel basis. Apparently, there was evidence that
54. 1 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 20.02[3].
55. 323 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
56. See discussion in Part IV, Section B, supra.
57. FLA. STAT § 689.11 (1975).
58. 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976).
59. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968, amended 1972).
60. FLA. STAT § 689.01 (1975). For a discussion of whether two witnesses are required in
executing a mortgage, see Part IV, Section B, supra.
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the husband did not act in good faith and purposely deceived his
wife by failing to fulfill the statutory requirements.'
2. LEGISLATION
The Florida Legislature changed the homestead exemption
laws in 1976, but continued the policy of liberally construing home-
stead exemptions. One new provision 2 states that the head of the
family status required to qualify for the creditor exemption shall
inure to the benefit of the surviving spouse of the owner, or tenant
by the entirety. Furthermore, the statute permits acquisition of
such status to inure to the survivor despite the fact two persons are
not living together as one family under the direction of one who is
recognized as head of the family.
A change was also made regarding the homestead tax exemp-
tion for certain permanently and totally disabled veterans. The new
law6 eliminates the recital of specific criteria defining what consti-
tutes total disability.
D. Easements
In creating an easement, careful draftsmanship is extremely
important. The language used should be clear so that proper con-
struction of the instrument may be determined without considering
extraneous matters or surrounding circumstances. 4 In Procacci v.
Zaccoll an estate sold one parcel of land to an heir and subsequently
conveyed an adjoining parcel of land to a corporation "subject to an
easement for road right-of-way," although no prior easement ex-
isted. The corporation subsequently conveyed its land, and the new
owners began construction which infringed on the strip supposedly
designated as an easement. The heir of the original estate, who
owned the adjoining property, sought to enjoin the construction.
The trial court denied such injunction stating that no easement was
reserved since the language "subject to" was insufficient to create
any easement.
61. 335 So. 2d at 813-14.
62. FLA. STAT § 222.19 (Supp. 1976).
63. FLA. STAT. § 196.081(1) (Supp. 1976).
64. 1 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 23.03[1]. See generally Robinson v. Feltus, 68 So. 2d
815 (Fla. 1953); Kotick v. Durrant, 143 Fla. 386, 196 So. 802 (1940).
65. 324 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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There had been no prior Florida appellate decision regarding
this issue, and the heir appealed to the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, which affirmed the trial court's ruling. The court
noted that the use of the "subject to" phrase to create an easement
often leads to unclear and ambiguous results. " Therefore, it was
necessary to examine the surrounding circumstances in attempting
to understand the intentions of the parties. But the court had no
such facts which would have permitted creation of an easement by
the words "subject to."
The court held that no easement in favor of the estate could
exist. The estate had quitclaimed its interest in the parcel to the
corporation without the two parties agreeing to reserve an easement
for the benefit of the heir. There had been no reference to any
easement in the conveyance of land from the estate to the heir.
Furthermore, the court noted there could be no easement by impli-
cation since there was no unity of ownership of the alleged dominant
and servient tracts at the time of the conveyance. No easement by
prescription existed since there was no evidence of use of the strip.
In Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 7 however, the possibil-
ity that a prescriptive easement existed was noted by the Supreme
Court of Florida. The City of Hollywood had uninterruptedly pub-
lished to the world that it owned certain beaches, and it openly and
adversely occupied such beaches by erecting showers, planting
trees, providing life guards, and posting signs. Although the city had
not obtained permission to use the beaches, it had spent over one
million dollars maintaining and improving the beaches over a fifty
year period for the public's daily use. The court stated that the
public could obtain a prescriptive right to use the beaches and re-
manded the case to the trial court to determine if a prescriptive
easement had been created.
E. Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive covenants may be of unlimited duration since they
do not create an interest in land and are not subject to disqualifica-
tion by the Rule Against Perpetuities 8 However, enforcement of
such convenants may be enjoined if there is sufficient change in the
66. Id. at 182. But see Owen v. Yount, 198 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
67. 321 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1975).
68. 1 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 24.12[1].
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character of the neighborhood to frustrate the objectives of the re-
striction:"5 It is difficult to generalize from the cases precisely how
much change is sufficient in order to remove the restriction.'
In Crissman v. Dedakis7' the District Court of Appeal, First
District, affirmed a trial court's ruling that restrictive covenants
may be removed from part, but not all, of a landowner's property.
There had been substantial and radical changes in the general area
of the landowner's subdivision, although no changes had occurred
within the subdivision itself. Relief from the restrictive covenants
was granted since there would be no detrimental effect upon other
properties in the subdivision.
The court distinguished Allen v. Avendale Co.72 since that deci-
sion had emphasized that all the changes had occurred prior to the
time plaintiff purchased his land subject to the restrictions, while
the changes in Crissman occurred subsequent to her acquisition.
The court also noted that the covenants had no expiration date,
whereas in Allen the covenants had only fourteen months to run.
Although Crissman did not delineate the facts which constitute
substantial change, it seems quite likely that the court was influ-
enced by the fact that the restrictive covenants had no expiration
date.
In determining whether a significant change has occurred such
that continued enforcement of restrictive covenants, such as the
ones in Crissman, would be inequitable, a declaratory judgment
would appear to be a logical and useful device. A landowner could
then determine a covenant's validity without having to violate it
first. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, however, ruled
that procedure inappropriate in such cases because precedent had
held that where there is no doubt as to the meaning of a written
instrument and the only issue is a factual determination of whether
the parties fall within the terms of the particular instrument, decla-
ratory judgments may not be obtained. Nevertheless, the court did
69. Id. § 24.12[2].
70. Id. See generally Allen v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938); Osius v.
Barton, 129 Fla. 184, 176 So. 65 (1937); Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164
So. 551 (1935).
71. 330 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
72. 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
73. Lambert v. Justus, 313 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), rev'd, 335 So. 2d 818 (Fla.
1976), citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Johnson, 201 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1967); Columbia Cas. Co.
v. Zimmerman, 62 So., 2d 338 (Fla. 1952); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Intercity Supply
Corp., 212 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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believe the issue was of great public interest and certified it to the
Supreme Court of Florida.
Fortunately, the supreme court, in Lambert v. Justus,7
quashed the Second District's decison and found that the
"declaratory judgment procedure was an appropriate and available
remedy" in this case. The court noted that the cases deemed by the
Second District to be controlling75 were easily distinguishable in
that they merely sought judicial determination of a fact unrelated
to the construction or validity of the instrument.
IV. MORTGAGES
A. Contracts for Deed
The Florida statutory definition " of mortgages makes it clear
that a number of instruments not formally termed mortgages may
be mortgages under certain conditions.77 One such instrument, the
contract or agreement for deed, generally has been construed as
equivalent or similar to mortgage agreements by recent cases.7
In Torcise v. Perez7" land purchasers sought a temporary in-
junction prohibiting the vendor, inter alia, from further use and
trespass on property conveyed by contracts for deed. The contracts
for deed provided that the purchasers would make down payments
and monthly payments until the amount paid was equal to the
original selling price plus interest, but were silent as to who was
entitled to possession prior to payment of all the installments. The
trial court granted temporary injunctive relief, and on appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed. Citing Florida
Statutes section 697.01(1) (1975), the Third District held that the
contracts for deed were mortgages, thus entitling the purchasers to
the use and possession of the properties in the absence of a contrary
provision in the agreements.
74. 335 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1976).
75. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
76. FLA. STAT. § 697.01(1) (1975).
77. See generally 2 R. BoYEa, supra note 2, § 32.02.
78. Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975). See State ex rel. Four-Fifty
Two-Thirty Corp. v. Dickinson, 322 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1975); Zeigler v. Hawkins, 315 So. 2d
200 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975). See also Part II, Sections F & G, supra.
79. 319 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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B. Formalities of Execution
Under the former Florida Constitution, a mortgage of the home-
stead had to be properly attested by two witnesses in order to be
effective. 0 This result was a logical conclusion from a group of
cases8 holding that a contract for a conveyance of the homestead
had to have two witnesses in order for it to be specifically enforced.
The justification for such holdings was the constitutional provisions
that a homestead could be conveyed or mortgaged by a duly exe-
cuted instrument. "Duly executed" has been interpreted to mean
compliance with the statute83 prescribing the formalities of convey-
ancing. Such formalities include an "instrument in writing signed
in the presence of two subscribing witnesses . ".8.."4 Since the
words "duly executed" are omitted from the comparable provision
of the 1968 constitution,"8 a question exists as to whether the convey-
ancing statute is still applicable to a mortgage of the homestead.
Because the pertinent provision of the 1968 constitution uses
the phrase, "alienate the homestead by mortgage,""8 it is possible
that the conveyancing statute, requiring two witnesses, might be
construed as still applicable. However, the style of the present con-
stitution appears to liberalize the homestead law. 7 Upon examining
the aforementioned constitutional changes, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, in Reliable Finance Co. v. Axon,"8 ex-
pressed serious doubt as to the continued viability of prior cases
which required the attestation of two witnesses to effectuate the
mortgage of a homestead. The court did not reach that issue, how-
ever, because it found that the mortgaged property was not a home-
stead. Until the Supreme Court of Florida specifically holds other-
wise, the only safe course of action is to assume that two witnesses
still are required.
80. Perry v. Beckerman, 97 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957).
81. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957); Abercrombie v. Eid-
schun, 66 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1953); Scott v. Hotel Martinique, 48 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1950).
82. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1885).
83. FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1975).
84. Id.
85. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
86. Id.
87. 2 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 32.06[3].
88. 336 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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C. Foreclosure
1. PARTIES
The proper party to bring foreclosure is the holder of the note
and mortgage. s9 During the survey period, a number of cases dealt
with the issue of who is the proper party when a Massachusetts
business trust is involved.
In Your Construction Center, Inc. v. Gross90 a trustee of a Mas-
sachusetts business trust brought suit to foreclose a note and mort-
gage on Florida real estate. The defendants, contending that each
trustee of the trust company should be named as plaintiff, moved
to dismiss. The trial court denied the defendants' motion. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed, holding that where
a note and mortgage are executed naming as payee only one trustee
of such a trust, that trustee is entitled to maintain an action on the
note and mortgage to discharge the obligation.
Similarly, in Overseas Development Inc. v. Krause9 the defen-
dant moved to dismiss a mortgage foreclosure action, arguing that
the plaintiff, a Massachusetts business trust, must be represented
by all the trustees. Citing Your Construction Center, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that where the nominee of a
business trust is the named payee on the indebtedness which is the
subject of a mortgage foreclosure, the nominee is a proper party to
bring suit.
The court in Tampa Properties, Inc. v. Great American Mort-
gage Investors92 had to decide whether a Massachusetts business
trust, qualified to do business in Florida, has the capacity to fore-
close a mortgage without its trustees becoming plaintiffs in the suit.
Noting the trend in the Florida decisions not to require the appear-
ance of all the trustees as plaintiffs, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, answered this question in the affirmative. The de-
cision failed to indicate who was named as payee on the mortgage.
2. FACTORS AFFECTING THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE
The general rule has been that bankruptcy proceedings against
the mortgagor do not affect mortgage foreclosures if they are begun
89. 2 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 32.20[3].
90. 316 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
91. 323 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
92. 333 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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after the foreclosure suit is commenced. In that event the trustee
would take title to the mortgaged property subject to the foreclosure
proceedings, and the foreclosure could continue." Apparently this
general proposition has been superseded by rule 11-44(a) of the the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 4 In Heritage Family Pub, Inc. v.
First Federal Savings and Loan Association,5 the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that pursuant to rule 11-44(a), a
mortgagor's filing of a petition in bankruptcy operates as a stay of
the enforcement of a judgment foreclosing a mortgage, precluding
a judicial sale of the property and the issuance of a certificate of
sale.
3. ACCELERATION
In Chopan v. Klinkman96 the vendors conveyed realty subject
to a mortgage and, as part of the transaction, received a second
mortgage from the purchasers. The second mortgage contained an
acceleration clause which permitted the vendor-mortgagees to fore-
close if the purchaser-mortgagors resold the property. Subse-
quently, the mortgagors executed an agreement for deed by which
they, as contract vendors, agreed to convey the realty to the contract
vendees if the vendees made the payments and kept the other cove-
nants provided for in the agreement.
Thereafter, the mortgagees commenced an action to foreclose
the second mortgage under the acceleration clause. The trial court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed. Noting that the controlling issue
was whether the agreement for deed constituted a sale of property
so as to give the mortgagees a right to accelerate the balance of the
mortgage, the Fourth District held that the execution of an agree-
ment for deed was not such a sale since it provided for the convey-
93. Tucker v. Crown Corp., 136 Fla. 517, 183 So. 740 1938). See also 2 R. BoYER, supra
note 2, § 32.20[2).
94. Rule 11-44a applies to chapter XI proceedings and reads:
(a) Stay of Actions and Lien Enforcement. A petition filed under Rule 11-6 or
11-7 shall operate as a stay of the commencement or the continuation of any court
or other proceeding against the debtor, or the enforcement of any judgment
against him, or of any act or the commencement or continuation of any court
proceeding to enforce any lien against his property, or of any court proceeding,
except a case pending under Chapter X of the Act, for the purpose of the rehabili-
tation of the debtor or the liquidation of his estate.
95. 315 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
96. 330 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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ance of absolute title in the future. The court noted that while an
acceleration clause is a valid contractual provision,97 to enforce such
a clause "a court of equity should require the showing of a clear,
unequivocal right to forthwith call due the balance of the debt.""
4. USURY LEGISLATION
A 1976 legislative amendment" provides that the Florida usury
provisions shall not apply to either a Federal Housing Administra-
tion or Veteran's Administration loan or a sale made by a financial
institution at the time of a loan origination to the Federal National
Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage Association,
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or any other instrumen-
tality of the Federal Government.
D. Deficiency Decrees
After sale of the property for less than the amount found to be
due by the final judgment of foreclosure, the mortgagee bank in
Bradberry v. Atlantic Bank of St. Augustine °9 filed a motion for a
deficiency judgment. The mortgagor filed an answer denying that
the bank was entitled to a deficiency judgment and demanding a
jury trial. The trial court denied the demand for a jury trial, and
after a hearing, entered judgment for deficiency.
On appeal, the mortgagor contended that a denial of his de-
mand for a jury trial on the issues of the deficiency proceeding would
violate his right of trial by jury under the Florida Constitution.,"'
However, the District Court of Appeal, First District, rejected this
contention and affirmed, holding that a mortgagor has no statutory
or constitutional right to a jury trial on the question of a deficiency
decree in a chancery foreclosure action when a deficiency exists after
the foreclosure sale of the property. In reaching its decision, the
First District concluded that the consolidation of law and chancery
procedure into one form did not eliminate the court's chancery juris-
diction over deficiency decrees in foreclosure actions. Moreover, it
97. For a more complete discussion of acceleration clauses, see 1 R. BOYER, supra note
2, § 32.20[4]. See also Comment, Debt Acceleration on Transfer of Mortgaged Property, 29
U. MlAMI L. REV. 584 (1975).
98. 333 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
99. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-124 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (Supp. 1976)).
100. 336 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
101. FLA. CONST., art. I, § 22.
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found that while the statute'"2 providing for deficiency decrees in
mortgage foreclosure proceedings preserves the complainant's right
to sue at common law for a deficiency, the statute does not give a
corresponding right to the defendant to be sued at common law for
the deficiency.
E. Priorities and Recording-Constructive Notice
A duly recorded instrument constitutes constructive notice of
its existence and contents.' 3 It is also constructive notice of such
other facts as would have been learned if the record had been exam-
ined and inquiries suggested thereby duly prosecuted.'" ' Thus, refer-
ences in recorded instruments to an unrecorded option,' 5 a mort-
gage,' 6 and restrictions placed on land by a common grantor'07 have
been held to constitute constructive notice of such interests. Simi-
larly, a recorded mortgage describing a lot by the proper subdivision
name, but referring to the wrong plat book, has been held to be
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser at an execution
sale. '0 8
However, in Air Flow Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v.
Baker, ,09 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that
references in a recorded mortgage to a legal description in "attached
Exhibit A," which was in fact not attached, and to an unrecorded
loan agreement for purposes other than to provide a legal descrip-
tion were not sufficient to impart constructive notice even though
the loan agreement contained such legal description. Accordingly,
the court held that mechanics' liens, which related back to the
notice of commencement recorded later in the same day as the
defective mortgage, had priority. While noting that reference may
be made in a recorded document to another document for the pur-
pose of aiding any defect or uncertainty created by the recorded
instrument, the court explained: "[tihe reference to the existence
of another deed or unrecorded document must be specific not only
102. See FLA. STAT. §§ 702.06, 702.1 (1975).
103. Davis v. Brewer, 135 Fla. 752, 186 So. 207 (1938). See generally 1 R. BOYER, supra
note 2, § 27.01[1].
104. Hull v. Maryland Cas. Co., 79 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 1954).
105. Gross v. Hammond, 123 Fla. 471, 167 So. 373 (1936).
106. Kemp v. Skiveson, 114 Fla. 667, 154 So. 688 (1934).
107. Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1956).
108. Merrell v. Ridgely, 62 Fla. 546, 57 So. 352 (1911).
109. 326 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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in terms of identifying the other deed or document with particular-
ity but in putting a reasonable person on notice of the need to make
reference to such other deed or unrecorded document."' 0
The language in the mortgage creating the reference to the loan
agreement only related to the default by the mortgagor and the
options available to the mortgagee after such default. Thus, the
court found that the reference to the loan agreement in this context
would not compel a reasonable person to inquire about the missing
legal description or reasonably suggest that it would be necessary
to refer to the loan agreement in order to locate such description.
F. Balloon Mortgages
In defining balloon mortgages, Florida Statutes section
697.05(2)(a) (1975) states, in pertinent part: "Every mortgage in
which the final payment or the balance due and payable upon ma-
turity is greater than twice the amount of the regular monthly or
periodic payment of the said mortgage shall be deemed a balloon
mortgage . . . ." Thus, in Vlock v. Capodilupo" the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held the balloon mortgage statute inappl-
icable to a note executed by mortgagors in connection with their
agreement to purchase an interest in a condominium project, where
the note provided for one part payment of principal and the remain-
der to be paid seven months thereafter. The court found that this
method of payment did not constitute regular monthly or regular
periodic payments.
V. MECHANICS' LIENS
A. Privity
The Mechanic's Lien Laws"2 establish different procedures and
regulations for lienors in privity with the owner from those not in
privity."3 The chief distinction is that lienors not in privity must
serve notice that they are furnishing service or materials within
forty-five days of the date their service begins."4 The obvious reason
for such a rule is to protect the owner from surprise and unfair loss.
110. Id. at 451-52.
111. 327 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
112. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.01-.36 (1975).
113. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.05-07 (1975).
114. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1975).
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Because the statutes do not specifically include sub-
subcontractors or their materialmen, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, had held that neither were to be accorded liens."'
Such rulings were unfortunate since the statutory procedures which
protect an owner from being surprised by a subcontractor or his
materialmen likewise would protect the owner from a sub-
subcontractor.
The Second District recently receded from its prior position
and held in Hey Kiley Man, Inc. v. Azalea Garden Apartments"'
that the statutory term "subcontractor" encompasses sub-
subcontractors as well as anyone else not in privity with the owner
who performs a portion of a contract to enhance realty. The court
disavowed former decisions to the contrary"7 and subscribed to the
reasoning used by the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in
Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg,"' where a sub-subcontractor was allowed
to enforce such a lien.
B. Perfection
A Contractor is required by statute either to give the owner, at
the time final payment is due, an affidavit stating that all liens have
been paid, or to provide the names of those not paid in full and the
amounts owed them."' Failure to furnish the affidavit will prevent
the contractor from perfecting a lien or having an action against the
debtor during the period of his default.' 0 However, if the contract
attached to the foreclosure complaint indicates that some prospec-
tive lienors were to be paid by the owner and that others were to be
paid by the contractor, an affidavit attached to the complaint list-
115. J. P. Driver Co. v. Claxton, 193 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967)(holding a sub-
subcontractor was not entitled to a lien). Although FLA. STAT. § 713.06 authorizes material-
men to have a lien, FLA. STAT. § 713.01(11) defines materialman only in terms of supplying
an owner, contractor, or subcontractor. But see Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1969).
116. 333 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 1976).
117. See J. P. Driver Co. v. Claxton, 193 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
118. 219 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). The court noted that Ceco "reasoned that the
statute should be construed broadly in order best to protect the interests of both the owners
and those for whose benefit the . . . [statute] was enacted . . . those who furnish labor,
services and materials to the benefit of the owners". 333 So. 2d at 50. Because the owner is
protected against "hidden liens" of those not in priority with him, the definition of subcon-
tractor must include sub-subcontractor as well.
119. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1)(1975).
120. Id.
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ing all the materialmen and laborers paid by the contractor (plain-
tiff) may constitute compliance with the statute. These were the
facts in Walter Harvey Corp. v. Cohen-Ager, Inc.,'21 where the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the trial judge's de-
nial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, finding the sworn state-
ment sufficient under the statute.
The Mechanic's Lien statutes also provide for a blanket lien
which may encumber more than one parcel of realty in certain cir-
cumstances.'22 In Kettles v. Charter Mortgage Co.'23 a supplier of
landscaping materials and services agreed with a builder to a price
per yard for sod and a price per shrub for ornamentals. The materi-
als were to be supplied for an unspecified number of lots under
construction by the builder. The builder acquired the lots and built
upon them in groups of a few lots at a time, and the landscaper
presumed the arrangement would continue as long as his work was
satisfactory. Rather than filing separate claims of lien'24 on each of
approximately forty lots for which he provided services and materi-
als, the landscaper elected to file a blanket lien pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 713.09(1) (1975).
The trial judge ruled that the landscaper's claim of lien was
invalid in that he had no "same direct contract"'25 with the builder
for the work on the forty lots. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, affirmed, stating that "to hold that any future services in
an indefinite amount and duration constitute a 'same direct con-
tract' would destroy the orderly use of the mechanic's lien laws."' 26
C. Lienor's Notice
The Mechanic's Lien Law requires non-privity lienors, other
than laborers or those furnishing professional services, to file notice
to the owner within forty-five days of commencement of services to
perfect their liens.'27 Although the statutory language is mandatory,
121. 317 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
122. FLA. STAT § 713.09(1) (1975).
123. 337 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
124. If the landscaper had filed separate claims on each of the lots, he would have lost
his priority on certain lots and blocks on which he completed work more than ninety days
prior to filing his claim of lien. See FLA. STAT § 713.08(5) (Supp. 1976).
125. FLA. STAT § 713.09(1) (1975) requires the work to have been done as part of the
"same direct contract."
126. 337 So. 2d at 1014.
127. FLA. STAT. H§ 713.03-.06(2) (1975).
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the Supreme Court of Florida adopted a more liberal construction
in order to afford protection most compatible with justice and eq-
uity. Therefore, lienors who file notice after the forty-five day limit
still may participate either in full or pro rata to the extent funds
remain due from the owner to the contractor after payment has been
made to the "priority" lienors"' Of course, it is necessary for the
complaint to allege the existence of any undisbursed or improperly
paid funds in order to avoid dismissal." 9 However, an owner may
have the burden of proving as a defense that his payments were
proper when the lienor shows a proper claim and the owner failed
to file a notice of abandonment of the contract with the general
contractor.""
A recent Fourth District case seems to be in contravention of
the well settled rule. In Partin v. Konsler Steel Co.'3 the court
stated: "This law [Florida Statutes section 713.06 (1975)] is ex-
plicit that a notice to owner must be served before commencing or
not later than forty-five days from commencing to furnishing its
materials. This is an absolute prerequisite to perfecting a lien."',"
The lienor claimant had filed its notice after the forty-five days had
passed, but the owner had paid all sums due on the contract except
for a small amount for some extras, which was paid to the claimant.
The owner sought to cancel the lien and the lienor counterclaimed
for foreclosure to recover the balance due him from the contractor.
Apparently, the owner failed to obtain a final payment affidavit
from the contractor. 33
The trial court found the lienor was entitled to foreclosure, but
the Fourth District, requiring that the Mechanics' Lien Law be
strictly construed, reversed and held that the lienor could not rely
on the owner's failure to obtain a payment affidavit to excuse the
lienor's failure to file notice within forty-five days. This broad state-
ment seems inconsistent with the intent of the supreme court in that
it indicates an absolute bar to recovery, rather than simply affecting
the lienor's priority.' However, in this particular case the actual
128. Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969). Numerous cases have applied the
Crane rule. See 2 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 33.09.
129. Bell v. Boy's, Inc., 325 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist, 1976). See also Economy Suppliers
& Fabricators, Inc. v. Centennial Homes, Inc., 325 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
130. See Torres v. MacIntyre, 334 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
131. 336 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
132. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
133. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1975).
134. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
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result may have been the same since all the money had been paid
out.
D. Security Bonds
1. TRANSFERS OF LIENS TO SECURITY
A lien may be transferred to other security by the owner of the
encumbered property." 5 The other security may consist of either
depositing a sum of money with the clerk, or executing and filing a
surety bond. 3' If the owner properly transfers the lien to a surety
bond and is not in privity with the lienor, a question arises as to
whether the owner is a necessary or proper party to a foreclosure suit
on the mechanic's lien, The District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, answered that question in the negative in Deltona Corp. v.
Indian Palms, Inc. "I The owner properly had transferred the lien to
a surety bond, and a materialman not in privity with the owner
brought suit to foreclose on the lien. The trial judge dismissed the
action against the owner and ordered joinder of the surety company.
In affirming, the Second District reasoned that since there was
no privity, no direct action existed against the owner. Any such
action would be to impress a lien on the property, and the only
reason the owner would be a necessary party is to satisfy due process
as to his property. The court stated that the purpose of the statute
was to permit an owner to remove the cloud of lien from his property
by posting a bond. Since the rights of a lienor not in privity3 s with
the owner are determined by the equities between the lienor and the
parties with whom he has privity (i.e., the general contractor), the
court reasoned that the owner is not a necessary party to the action.
In fact, it noted that the owner may not be a proper party if he
chooses not to contest the amount of lien.
A different result was obtained in McGuire v. Consolidated
Electrical Supply, Inc. 39 There the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that a lien cannot be foreclosed unless the property
owner is made a party to the suit despite the fact that the lien has
135. FLA. STAT. § 713.24(1) (1975).
136. Id.
137. 323 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
138. The court noted in a footnote that if the lienor had been in privity with the owner,
the result would have been different since the lienor could have brought a personal action
against the owner if he failed to establish all or part of his lien. 323 So. 2d at 283 n.2.
139. 329 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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been transferred to a surety bond. In McGuire, the individual defen-
dants owned a tract of land which they sold to a corporation. Just
prior to the sale, a materialman commenced delivering materials to
be used in improving the realty. Subsequently, the materialman
brought suit against the former individual owners to foreclose a
mechanic's lien, although he was well aware the corporation was the
true owner. The corporation transferred the lien to a surety bond,
and the bonding company was made a party defendant. The corpo-
rate owner was never made a party, and the trial court entered
judgment against the former individual owners and the surety.
The Fourth District reversed as to the individuals stating that
even if they had been the owners, no personal action would lie
against them as there was no privity with the lienor. The court also
reversed the judgment against the bonding company on the ground
that the liability of a surety ordinarily is measured by the liability
of its principal, and the principal had not been made a party to the
action. The Fourth District noted that since the bond had not been
introduced into evidence, the court could not determine if the lienor
could maintain suit against the surety without its principal. Such
language might be viewed as stating that in some cases the owner
would not be a necessary party if he transferred the lien. to a secu-
rity. However, the Deltona decision presumably indicates that the
Third District would not make such a qualification.
2. PAYMENT BONDS
If an owner wishes to exempt himself from the Mechanics' Lien
Law, he may, at his option, require the contractor to furnish a
payment bond pursuant to section 713.23 of the Florida Statutes
(1975). In Guin & Hunt, Inc. v. Hughes Supply, Inc. 40 a general
contractor and the surety contended the bond was a performance
bond rather than a payment bond envisioned by section 713.23.
The bond in question contained a condition that the surety
would not be liable unless the owner and lender made all payments
and fulfilled all conditions pursuant to the contract with the general
contractor. When a subcontractor who had not been paid sought to
recover on the bond as provided by section 713.23, the contractor
and surety claimed as an affirmative defense that the bond was a
common law bond, that they were free to contract for any type of
140. 335 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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bond they desired, and that, therefore, they need not pay on such
bond since the contractor had not received certain payments from
the owner or lender.
The trial court rejected their affirmative defense and granted
summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The Fourth Dis-
trict affirmed the trial court, holding that a bond purporting to
protect against mechanics' liens must be construed as a payment
bond contemplated by section 713.23, and not merely a performance
bond. The court noted that the subcontractor was a third party
donee obligee of the bond, and his rights were vested and could not
be defeated by failure of the owner or lender to comply with special
provisions of the bond.
E. Attorney's Fees
The prevailing party in an action brought to enforce a lien may
recover a reasonable attorney's fee.'41 Determining who is the pre-
vailing party may become more difficult if there are several counter-
claims, crossclaims, or third party claims involved. In Padgett v.
Gulfstream Air Conditioning Co.'42 the court held that when final
judgment in a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien was entered in favor
of defendant against plaintiff, with an amount ultimately awarded
to defendant based upon the court's recognition of the defendant's
counterclaim, which was substantially satisfied by further judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff in a third party action, the award to
plaintiff of attorney's fees was erroneous.
Whether the statute permits recovery of attorney's fees at the
appellate level as well as the trial level had been the subject of some
disagreement. The First and Second District Courts of Appeal had
held that such fees are not recoverable,'43 while the Fourth District
allowed the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees for the ap-
peal. 44
The Supreme Court of Florida recently decided the issue in
Sunbeam Enterprises, Inc. v. Upthegrove. '4 The court stated that
141. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1975).
142. 312 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
143. R. F. Driggers Constr. Co. v. Bagli, 313 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Babe's
Plumbing, Inc. v. Maier, 194 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967); John T. Wood Homes, Inc. v.
Air Control Prods., Inc., 177 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
144. Foxbilt Elec., Inc. v. Belefant, 280 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
145. 316 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1975).
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awarding attorney's fees was in derogation of the common law and
that statutes authorizing such fees should be strictly construed.
Because the statute'" does not expressly authorize awarding attor-
ney's fees incurred on appeal, the supreme court held they were not
recoverable.
VI. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. General Legislation
Other than passage of the new Mobile Home Act,'47 little signif-
icant landlord-tenant legislation was passed during the survey pe-
riod. In 1976 the security deposit law was amended to provide that
if the landlord makes a claim on part of the tenant's security deposit
and the tenant does not object, the landlord must remit the balance
of the security deposit to the tenant within thirty days. 4'
Security deposits were the subject of litigation in Department
of Business Regulations, Division of Hotels and Restaurants v.
Stein, 49 which held that Florida Statutes section 83.49(2) (1973) did
not require the payment of interest on security deposits created
prior to the effective date of the statute, October 1, 1972. However,
the court specifically refused to rule on the effect of the 1975 amend-
ment which created subsection (6) to provide that security deposits
carried forward upon renewal of an existing lease are to be consid-
ered "new security deposits.""'5 Presumably, any lease with a secu-
rity deposit created prior to October 1, 1972, but renewed subse-
quent to the 1975 amendment, would require payment of interest.
Rule 2-11.07'"' under Florida's "Little FTC" Act, created pur-
suant to the department's rulemaking authority,' 2 has declared re-
taliatory conduct by landlords, such as increased rents or eviction,
to be an unfair trade practice.'53 The rule itself might constitute an
146. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1975).
147. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-81 (codified at FLA. STAT §§ 83.750-.765 (Supp. 1976)), dis-
cussed in Part VI, Section B, infra.
148. FLA. STAT. § 83.49(3)(b) (Supp. 1976).
149. 326 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
150. FLA. STAT. § 83.49(6) (Supp. 1976).
151. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-11.07 (1976).
152. FLA. STAT. § 501.205 (1975).
153. See also 76 Op. ATr'y GEN. 48 (1976). It might also be argued that retaliation would
constitute a breach of the good faith requirment, or it may be found unconscionable, such
that it should be a permissible defense. FLA. STAT. § 83.51(1) (1975). See generally 2 R. BOYER,
supra note 2, § 37A.03.
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
affirmative defense in an eviction action brought by the landlord in
county court, but a more certain method of asserting it may be to
file a counterclaim based on the remedies afforded by Florida's
"Little FTC," and remove the case to the circuit court which would
have jurisdiction to grant an injunction.
In Kendig v. Kendall Construction Co. "4 the tenant had sought
a declaration that the landlord's termination of his tenancy and
threatened eviction were retaliatory actions and asked that the
landlord be enjoined from evicting the tenant without good cause.
The landlord subsequently brought an eviction action in county
court, and the two suits were consolidated and tried in circuit court.
The trial court found the landlord's conduct was a complete bar to
his eviction action, but only enjoined its prosecution for two weeks.
However, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, finding it
unnecessary to address the injunction issue, held that the case
should have been dismissed because of the landlord's actions. Be-
cause Kendig is not clear on the proper procedure to invoke the rule,
it would be advisable to seek an injunction and not rely on the rule
itself as an affirmative defense.
The procedures for enforcing Florida's innkeeper's lien stat-
utes'55 were declared unconstitutional in Johnson v. Riverside Hotel,
Inc. 5 The federal court stated that the procedures of excluding
guests from their rooms and locking their belongings inside violated
procedural due process. The court noted that postseizure procedures
provided under Florida Statutes section 85.011 (1975) do not cure
the defects. Finally, the court found the innkeeper's seizure of a
guest's property to be "under color of state law" such as to fall
within the purview of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.' s
B. Mobile Home Parks-Legislation
In 1976 the legislature enacted the Florida Mobile Home Land-
lord and Tenant Act.' 8 This Act considerably expands pre-existing
legislation on mobile home parks and closely parallels Florida's gen-
154. 317 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
155. FLA. STAT. § 713.67-.69 (1975).
156. 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
158. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-81 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 83.750-.765 (Supp. 1976)). See
also 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-278. For a more complete discussion of this legislation, see 2 R.
BOYER, supra note 2, §§ 37A.25-.36.
1212 [Vol. 31:1183
REAL PROPERTY
eral Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.'59 The new Act applies
only to tenancies in which a mobile home is placed upon a rented
or leased lot in a mobile home park for residential purposes.6 0 If
both the mobile home and lot are rented, the tenancy is governed
by the regular Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.' 6' The new Act
excludes parks with ten or less mobile home lots' as well as rentals
of space for recreational type vehicles designed primarily for tempo-
rary living quarters.'63
The Mobile Home Act, like the regular Residential Act, im-
poses an obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement
of every rental agreement 4 and renders unconscionable provisions
unenforceable.' Another similarity between the two acts is the new
legislative provision relating to attorney's fees. This section provides
that if a rental agreement contains a provision allowing attorney's
fees to the mobile home park owner, the court also may allow attor-
ney's fees to the mobile home owner who prevails in any action by
or against him. 6
The Mobile Home Act expressly states that a rental agreement
may provide a specific duration with respect to the amount of rental
payments and other conditions of the tenancy; but the agreement
may neither provide for, nor be construed to provide for, the termi-
nation of any rental agreement except as provided in the Act. 67
Moreover, to the extent that a provision attempts to waive or pre-
clude the rights or requirements set forth in the Act, it is void and
unenforceable.'68
The park owner is allowed access to mobile homes only upon
prior written consent of the homeowner or to prevent imminent
danger to the occupant or the mobile home.6 9 Such consent may be
revoked in writing by the mobile homeowner at any time. But the
159. FLA. STAT. § 83.40-.63 (1975), as amended by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-15 (codified
at FLA. STAT. 1 83.49 (Supp. 1976)).
160. FLA. STAT. § 83.751 (Supp. 1976).
161. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40-.63 (1975), as amended by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-15 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 83.49 (Supp. 1976)).
162. FLA. STAT. § 83.760(6) (Supp. 1976).
163. FLA. STAT. § 83.760(5) (Supp. 1976).
164. FLA. STAT. § 83.753 (Supp. 1976).
165. FLA. STAT. § 83.754 (Supp. 1976).
166. FLA. STAT. § 83.756 (Supp. 1976).
167. FLA. STAT. § 83.755(1) (Supp. 1976).
168. FA. STAT. § 83.755(2) (Supp. 1976).
169. FA. STAT. §83.757 (Supp. 1976).
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park owner has the right of entry at all reasonable times for purposes
of repair and replacement of utilities, as well as for the protection
of the mobile home park, provided that such entry does not unrea-
sonably interfere with the homeowner's quiet enjoyment of his lot.'"
In addition, the Act delineates the respective obligations of the
park owner and mobile home owner.' Both are required to comply
with applicable building, housing, and health codes.'72 The home-
owner must comply with all reasonable park rules and regulations,
and keep his mobile home lot in a clean and sanitary condition.'74
In turn, the park owner must maintain the common areas, as well
as the buildings and improvements therein,' and keep the utility
connections in a reasonably usable condition. 6 The park owner also
must provide access to the common areas, including buildings and
improvements, at all reasonable times for the park residents. 77
The Florida Act further requires mobile home parks to offer
written leases to their tenants. 7" No tenancy for valuable considera-
tion in' such a park, except one for transient occupancy, may be
enforced or terminated unless prior to the occupancy the tenant has
been offered a written lease. If the mobile homeowner does not enter
into a written lease or if the written lease has expired, the tenancy
may be terminated only in accordance with the statutory provisions
relating to eviction. 8 °
A mobile home park owner or operator may not evict a mobile
home or mobile home dweller other than for the following reasons:
(1) nonpayment of rent; (2) conviction of a violation of a law or
ordinance where the violation is deemed detrimental to the health,
safety, or welfare of the other park dwellers; (3) violation of any
reasonable park rule or regulation; or (4) change in the use of the
land comprising the mobile home park subject to certain notice
requirements.''
170. Id.
171. FLA. STAT. § 83.758 (Supp. 1976).
172. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.758(1)(b), (2)(a) (Supp. 1976).
173. FLA. STAT. § 83.758(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
174. FLA. STAT. § 83.758(1)(c) (Supp. 1976).
175. FLA. STAT. § 83.758(2)(b) (Supp. 1976).
176. FLA. STAT. § 83.758(2)(d) (Supp. 1976).
177. FLA. STAT. § 83.758(2)(c) (Supp. 1976).
178. FLA. STAT. § 83.760 (Supp. 1976).
179. FLA. STAT. § 83.760(1) (Supp. 1976).
180. FLA. STAT. § 83.759 (Supp. 1976).
181. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.759(a)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1976).
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The Act is designed to protect tenants who have no available
alternative for relocation from unexpected evictions when the park
is rezoned or converted to other uses. It specifically provides that
no local or state agency may approve an application for rezoning or
take official action which would result in the removal or relocation
of mobile home owners, or which is opposed by the park owner,
without first investigating the adequacy of other parks or suitable
facilities for relocation.' 2 Presumably, a governmental unit could
investigate and find no adequate alternative facilities but neverthe-
less approve a rezoning and termination of the park.
Other significant provisions of the Mobile Home Act relate to
such matters as the remedies available to park owners and mobile
home owners," 3 defenses to actions for rent or possession,' 4 the pur-
chase of equipment and installation of appliances,"' the disclosure
of and limitations on fees and charges," 6 and restrictions on the sale
of mobile homes. 8 7
C. Default-Waiver
Landlords frequently provide in their leases for a right of reen-
try should the tenant breach any of the conditions or covenants in
the lease.' In Dumor Avionics, Inc. v. Hangar One, Inc."9 a sixty
month lease agreement provided that the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy by the tenant would constitute a default. After the ten-
ant filed for bankruptcy, the landlord orally notified the tenant that
although it considered the lease in default the tenant would be
permitted to remain on the premises as a tenant at will from month
to month. Subsequently, the landlord notified the tenant that the
monthly rent would be increased. The tenant paid the increase but
thereafter fell in arrears, and the landlord sued for unlawful deten-
tion and claimed damages for the rent due. The tenant contended
the landlord waived any default which may have resulted from the
182. FLA. STAT. § 83.760(4) (Supp. 1976).
183. FLA. STAT. § 83.761 (Supp. 1976).
184. FLA. STAT. § 83.763 (Supp. 1976).
185. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.764(1)-(2) (Supp. 1976).
186. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.764(3)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1976).
187. FLA. STAT. § 83.765 (Supp. 1976).
188. 2 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 35.03[2]. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 83.53(2)-(3) (1975) for
a statutory right of reentry in residential leasing.
189. 319 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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filing for bankruptcy by accepting rent with full knowledge of that
fact.
The trial court found for the plaintiff landlord, awarding dam-
ages for back rent and attorney's fees. However, the trial court also
held that the tenant would have one more year as tenant at the
increased rental rate. The landlord appealed and the tenant cross-
appealed to the District Court of Appeal, Third District. The Third
District stated that the question of waiver is generally one of fact
to be tried on the issues properly defined in the pleadings. 9 " The
court found that there was substantial evidence upon which the trier
of fact could conclude that the landlord notified the tenant that the
lease was null and void, that a tenancy from month to month was
created, and therefore there was no waiver on the default.
However, the Third District correctly held that the trial judge's
refusal to grant possession to the landlord was error. In effect, the
trial judge had rewritten the lease agreement by enabling the tenant
to retain possession for one year at the increased rent. That portion
of the order was reversed and remanded with instructions to award
possession of the premises to the landlord.
D. Damages
The landlord has a duty to deliver possession of the premises
to the tenant on the date that the lease is to take effect; failure to
do so may result in a breach of contract action against the land-
lord. "' A question arises as to whether special damages, such as
disruption of business or loss of income, may also be recovered. In
Sales Careers, Inc. v. Atrium Office Park, Inc. 2 a tenant sought to
recover special damages from the landlord as a result of its negligent
notification to the tenant that the premises were ready for occu-
pancy when in fact they were not ready. The lease provided that the
recovery would be limited to the abatement of rent for a period no
longer than seventeen days. The trial judge found the provision
limiting damages to be controlling and transferred the action to
county court since seventeen days of rent would be less than the
minimum jurisdictional amount ($2,500.00) required by the circuit
190. See Chaikin v. Skolnick, 201 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Davis v. Davis, 123
So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
191. 2 R. BoYER, supra note 2, § 35.09[1].
192. 318 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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court. On interlocutory appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court. The
Third District held that the cause of action sounded in tort and
that special damages recoverable in tort were not limited by the
contract provision.'93
E. Options
Options to renew or purchase are often the subject of litigation,
and the survey period did not prove to be an exception. There has
been some question as to whether it is necessary for the tenant, who
wishes to exercise his option to purchase, to tender the entire pur-
chase price at the time he exercises the option. In 1958, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that such tender was not necessary when the
lessor notified the lessee that she did not intend to convey the prop-
erty anyway.' The court noted that generally the issue would be a
question of construction of the instrument.'95
The District Court of Appeal, First District, may have broad-
ened the rule somewhat in Doolittle v. Fruehauf Corp., 19 where the
court stated that it would not be necessary to tender the purchase
money at the time the option was exercised if such condition was
not stated expressly in the option. The court further noted that the
only requirements for exercising an option are: (1) the optionee must
decide to purchase the property under the terms of the option, and
(2) such decision must be communicated to the optionor during the
life of the option.
In Doolittle the tenants wrote to the landlord during the life of
the option tendering "formal notice of their desire to purchase the
property."' 97 The court found that the letter, when read as a whole,
was not equivocal, ambiguous, or conditional and that the option
became a bilateral contract, which was binding on both parties and
enforceable by specific performance.
It has been held that a timely renewal of a lease would carry
with it and extend the life of an option to purchase which is exercisa-
ble during the term of the lease.' It also has been recognized that
193. See Holbrook v. City of Sarasota; 58 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1952).
194. Sisco v. Rottenberg, 104 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1958).
195. Id. at 375. See also 2 R. BOYER, supra note 2, § 35.07[3].
196. 332 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
197. Id. at 109.
198. Sisco v. Rottenberg, 104 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1958).
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under special circumstances, equity will permit the lessee to exer-
cise a renewal option although the time specified in the lease has
expired.'99 In Ledford v. Skinner"' the District Court of Appeal,
First District, applied both of these principles in holding that an
oral acceptance of the lessee's decision to renew the lease subse-
quent to the life of the option and the acceptance of monthly rental
payments for thirty-three months after expiration of the initial term
of the lease formed an equitable basis for allowing the lessees to
exercise their option to purchase. Even though the original lease had
required written notice to renew, the lessors were estopped from
denying the lease was renewed, and therefore, the option to pur-
chase was continued into the renewed lease under the rule of Sisco
v. Rottenberg.2'°
VII. CONDOMINIUMS
In 1976 the Florida Legislature completely revised all the stat-
utes relating to condominiums and cooperatives.2 Chapter 718, re-
lating solely to condominiums, and chapter 719, relating solely to
cooperatives, replaced chapter 711 of the Florida Statutes and be-
came effective January 1, 1977.203 Except for certain definitional
provisions, the chapters are substantially identical. Since condomi-
niums are the more prevalent form of ownership, this discussion will
briefly outline the most important changes with regard to condomi-
niums.204
Although the primary focus of the comprehensive revision was
the elimination of redundancies and ambiguities in the former law,
there were also some substantive changes. Common law condomi-
niums are no longer permitted, as all new condominiums must be
created under the Act.2"5 However, condominiums may now be cre-
199. Dugan v. Haige, 54 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1951). See also 2 R. BOYER, supra note 2, §
35.07[4].
200. 328 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
201. 104 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1958).
202. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-222 (codified at FLA. STAT. chs. 718 & 719 (Supp. 1976)).
203. Florida Statutes section 718.102 (Supp. 1976) provides that the act shall apply to
"every condominium created and existing in this state." But see Fleeman v. Case, 342 So.
2d 815 (1976) with regard to the nonretroactivity of certain provisions of the act.
204. The status of condominium legislation through 1975 was discussed in Boyer &
Shapiro, Twelfth Survey of Florida Law-Real Property, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 517 (1976).
205. See FLA. STAT. §§ 718.102, 718.104 (Supp. 1976). A constitutional question may be
presented insofar as the statutory provisions might conflict with rights obtained under those
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ated prior to actual construction,2"' with subsequent amendment of
the declaration after substantial completion. The Act has broad-
ened the definition of developer to include those who offer condomi-
nium parcels in the ordinary course of business.0 7
Every condominium association created after January 1, 1977,
must be incorporated either for profit or not for profit.2 " The asso-
ciation is now given a statutory right to sue."' A unit owner may be
personally liable for the acts or omissions of the association in rela-
tion to the common elements, but only to the extent of his pro rata
share in the same percentage as his interests in the common ele-
ments."' However, this exposure may be considerable, and a prob-
lem arises as to how the unit owner can protect himself.
Prior to commencement of construction, a developer must post
a bond or put an amount in escrow with the clerk of the county equal
to 110 percent of the ad valorem tax liability of the parcel for the
preceding year. 2'
The new Act increases from five to ten percent the amount of
sales deposits which must be placed in an escrow account.' Depos-
its in excess of ten percent may be used by the developer if the
contract of sale so provides." 3
The developer's warranties of implied fitness and merchanta-
regimes created before statutory authorization of condominiums, or with any rights obtained
after statutory authorization but in noncompliance therewith.
206. FLA. STAT § 718.104(4)(e) (Supp. 1976).
207. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(13) (Supp. 1976). Consequently mortgage foreclosures are ap-
parently governed by the provisions covering the rights and obligations of the developer.
208. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1) (Supp. 1976).
209. "After control of the association is obtained by unit owners other than the devel-
oper, the association may institute, maintain, settle or appeal actions or hearings in its name
on behalf of all unit owners concerning matters of common interest .... " FLA. STAT §
718.111(2) (Supp. 1976). This addition in the statute will permit the association to maintain
an action for representations made by a developer to individual purchasers which affect the
entire class of purchasers.
210. FLA. STAT. § 718.119(2) (Supp. 1976) is a direct reversal of former FLA. STAT § 711.18
(2) (1975) (repealed 1977) which provided that the unit owner should have no personal
liability for damages caused by the association or those in connection with the use of common
elements. However, the newly required corporate form does protect unit owners from joint
and several liability. Since most associations were created as corporations, the requirement
of corporate status has little effect. See also FLA. STAT. § 718.111(9) (Supp. 1976) which
requires the association to maintain adequate liability insurance.
211. FLA. STAT. § 718.201 (Supp. 1976).
212. FLA. STAT. § 718.202(1) (Supp. 1976) (increased from the five percent provided in
FLA. STAT. § 711.67(1) (1975) (repealed 1977)).
213. FLA. STAT § 718.202(3) (Supp. 1976).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
bility were reduced from five to three years."' Warranties for per-
sonal property transferred with or appurtenant to each unit are for
the same period as that provided by the manufacturer, but they
commence with the date of closing of the purchase or the date of
possession." 5
Condominiums may now be created on any leasehold which has
an unexpired term of at least fifty years."' The association must still
be given an option to purchase the lease, but parties independent
of the developer who hold underlying land leases are exempted from
granting this option." '
The Act provides specific enabling legislation for conversions,"'
gives explicit detail on the creation of phase developments, and
outlines the rights of unit owners in relation thereto."'
The Division of Florida Land Sales was given the power to
enforce and ensure compliance with condominium provisions in
1975.220 Each association was assessed a $1.00 per unit owner fee due
on October 1. Fees are now due January 1 each year and failure to
pay by June 1 will result in an additional assessment of ten percent
and loss of standing to sue until payment." '
The prospectus or offering circular requirements have been sim-
plified under the recent legislation.2 2 The Act also added section
193.023(4), prohibiting the tax assessor from taking rental value into
account when valuing leasehold interests in property serving the
unit owners.223
214. FA. STAT. § 718.203(l)(a) (Supp. 1976) (decreased from the five years provided in
FLA. STAT. § 711.65(1)(1975) (repealed 1977)).
215. FLA. STAT. § 718.203(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
216. FLA. STAT § 718.401 (Supp. 1976). FLA. STAT. § 711.08(1)(1975) (repealed'1977) had
required the initial term to be in excess of 98 years and the unexpired term to be in excess
of 50 years.
217. FLA. STAT. § 718.401(6)(d) (Supp. 1976).
218. FLA. STAT. § 718.402 (Supp. 1976).
219' FLA. STAT. § 718.403 (Supp. 1976).
220. FLA. STAT. § 711.801 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1) (Supp.
1976)). The name of the Division was also changed to the Division of Florida Land Sales and
Condominiums.
221. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(3)(a)(Supp. 1976).
222. FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (Supp. 1976).
223. FLA. STAT. § 193.023(4)(Supp. 1976).
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VIII. WATER LAW
A. Submerged Lands
The 1921 Butler Act 2 4 granted title to submerged lands, which
previously had been vested in the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Fund, to upland riparian owners together with the authority
to bulkhead and fill to the edge of the channel. 225 Although it ap-
peared that the Butler Act vested title automatically in the riparian
owners, it was held that such grant was provisional and conditioned
upon the riparian owners' compliance with the statute.12  Until the
owners actually filled in the land, it was subject to reversion to the
state at any time.2 17 This legislation was repealed in 1957 by the
Bulkhead Act, 228 and new procedures were enacted for bulkheading,
filling, and conveying submerged lands to upland owners.229
The effects of these legislative changes gave rise to the salient
issue in Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.210 In that case, the owner of land
lying between the Atlantic Ocean and a lake brought an action
against the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund seeking a declaration that the owner had the right to fill the
area between the high water mark and the bulkhead line. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, noted that the question to be
resolved was whether the trial court properly found that the land-
owner fell within the terms of section 11 of the Bulkhead Act. 21'
That section made the Bulkhead Act inapplicable to the extension
of, or addition to, existing lands or islands bordering on navigable
waters for which an application for a permit to fill lands or bottoms
lying between the high water mark and a bulkhead line was filed
with the United States Corps of Engineers prior to the effective date
of the Act.
Adopting the opinion of the trial court, the First District held
that where a bulkhead line has been established prior to June 11,
1957 (the effective date of the Bulkhead Act), and an application
224. 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537 (repealed 1957).
225. Id. See generally 1 R. BoYER, supra note 2, §25.08.
226.. Duval Eng'r & Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1955).
227. Holland v. Fort Pierce Fin. & Constr. Co., 157 Fla. 649, 2 So. 2d 76 (1946).
228. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-362, § 9.
229. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-362.
230. 331 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
231. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-362, § 11.
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for a permit to fill land between the high water mark and a bulkhead
line also has been filed with the Corps of Engineers before this date,
this area of land is subject to the Butler Act. Therefore, the Board
of Trustees had no authority to require the landowner to obtain a
permit before engaging in its filling operation, and the landowner
still had the right under the Butler Act to make the desired fill,
thereby acquiring title to the filled land.
Under the 1957 legislation, the Trustees of the Internal Im-
provement Fund have the authority to convey those submerged
lands affected by the legislation and to grant permits for their filling
and development.2 ' However, in State Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sea-Air Estates, Inc., 33 the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the water bodies
involved were artificially created navigable waters and thus fell
within a statutory exception234 to the regulatory authority of the
Board of Trustees. Apparently, the landowner had dredged canals
on its land and then "pulled the plugs" to connect these canals to
natural navigable waters. Since the court held the Board of Trustees
did not have jurisdiction, the landowner was not required to replace
the fill.
B. Nonnavigable Waters
The civil law has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida
as the rule applicable to the use of nonnavigable lakes by abutting
owners.235 This rule permits reasonable use of the entire water body
by each individual owning a part of the water bed and denies to any
one owner the right to fill or otherwise exclude other persons who
also own part of the lake bed. 3' But in Publix Super Markets, Inc.
v. Pearson237 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that
this "reasonable use" doctrine does not extend to artificial lakes.
In Publix the owners of homes bordering on water filled phos-
phate pits brought an action to prohibit another owner from re-
claiming and filling approximately ten acres of the pits located on
232. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-362.
233. 327 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
234. FLA. STAT. § 253.123(1) (1975).
235. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959). See generally 1 R. BOYER, supra note
2, § 25.04.
236. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
237. 315 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976).
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its land. The trial court enjoined the defendant from proceeding
with its proposed reclamation and development of the phosphate
pits. In reversing the trial court's ruling, the appellate court noted
the general proposition that riparian rights ordinarily do not attach
to artificial water bodies or streams. It also attempted to distinguish
Silver Blue Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Own-
ers Association2 3 by observing that, unlike the artificial lake in that
case, the phosphate pits in question were not encircled by a subdivi-
sion, nor had they been dedicated to recreational use by means of
deed restrictions.
It should be noted, however, that while the supreme court in
Silver Blue Lake Apartments upheld an injunction prohibiting the
use of an artificial lake by tenants of an abutting landowner on the
basis of a restrictive covenant, in dictum the majority opinion
stated in response to a question certified by a district court:
In our view, as an abstract proposition, the right of owners
of a portion of the bed (of an artificial lake, which is found as a
fact from the evidence to be a non-navigable lake,) to rent their
rights to use of the water surface to tenants of an apartment
complex on the land including a portion of the lake bed, is only
the right of lawful and reasonable use not detrimental to other
owners or lawful users .... 239
C. Pollution
In Sexton Cove Estates, Inc. v. State Pollution Control
Board,240 a real estate developer, upon being denied the necessary
certification that the canal dredging in its subdivision would not
affect water quality standards, petitioned for writ of certiorari to
review the order of the Florida Pollution Control Board. The District
Court ,of Appeal, First District, held that although the real estate
developer may have acted at its own peril in not securing a proper
238. 245 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1971).
239. Id. at 612 (emphasis in original).
240. 325 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976). See the related case, United States v. Sexton
Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 526 F.2d
1293 (5th Cir. 1976), noted in 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 697 (1977), where the federal government
obtained an injunction in the district court restraining the developer from conducting further
fill or excavation of the tidal navigable waterway. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction over five canals which connected directly to a natural
navigable water body, but that the Corps did not have jurisdiction over five landlocked
canals.
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permit before dredging, the required state certification that water
quality standards would not be violated by the dredged canals could
not be denied by using standards which had been established subse-
quent to the developer's application for an after-the-fact certifica-
tion."'
D. Administrative Control
Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett Pines"' involved the question
of whether the regulatory aspects of a well field project, particularly
with regard to environmental impact, are controlled by the Water
Resources Act243 or by the Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act.24' Development of the well field in Pasco County was
undertaken to furnish water to densely populated Pinellas County.
The plaintiff, a developer with large land holdings near the project,
alleged that the construction and operation of the well field consti-
tuted a development of regional impact which was proceeding with-
out complying with the Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act. It sought to enjoin the continuation of the project until
such compliance had been obtained.
Upon finding the well field to be a development of regional
impact, the trial court issued an injunction. On appeal, however,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, holding that
the regulatory aspects of a well field project specifically designed to
provide water for already existing developments in urbanized areas
are controlled by the Water Resources Act, rather than the Environ-
mental Land and Water Management Act. The Second District
concluded that the legislature considered that the state's environ-
mental concerns would be better met by holding that a development
whose very purpose is to supply water under the Water Resources
Act should be regulated solely within the purview of the appropriate
governmental agencies set up under that Act.
E. Legislation
The Florida Legislature recently passed the Environmental
241. During the pendency of the application for certification, Florida Statutes section
403.087(1) (1971) became effective.
242. 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
243. FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (1975).
244. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975).
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Reorganization Act of 1975.245 This Act represents a comprehensive
attempt to restructure the administration of the state's environmen-
tal laws. Among other notable things, the Act created the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation, which has assumed certain
powers and functions formerly within the ambit of the Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. Moreover, the
duties of the Pollution Control Board of the Department of Pollution
Control were transferred to the governor and cabinet.
In 1976 the legislature also made substantial amendments in
laws governing water management districts. 4 ' In part, this legisla-
tion transfers certain areas within a number of water management
districts to other districts. Each transferee district assumes all the
contractual obligations with respect to the transferred area and re-
ceives all the property interests therein. 47
IX. EMINENT DOMAINI
A. Nature and Extent of Power
The government's eminent domain power is limited to situa-
tions where it can show a public purpose and a reasonable necessity
for the taking.24 In Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development
Authority"' the condemnation of property in downtown Fort Lau-
derdale was sought in order to make room for a parking garage. The
parking garage was necessary to help ease the traffic problems that
were sure to follow the consruction of a shopping center above the
parking garage. Baycol complained that no public purpose had been
shown and argued that the goal of the condemnation was to con-
struct a shopping center. Without the shopping center there would
be no parking problems and no need for parking spaces.
While noting that there might be a "public benefit" from the
construction of the shopping center, the Supreme Court of Florida
drew a distinction between that kind of "public benefit" and the
245. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-22.
246. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-243, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT § 373.069(3) (1975)).
247. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-243, § 2 (codified at FiA. STAT. § 373.0691 (Supp. 1976)).
t The authors express their appreciation to Gerald J. Hayes, Articles & Comments
Editor, University of Miami Law Review, for his valuable contribution in the preparation of
this section of the survey.
248. Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 455 n.2 (Fla. 1975), citing
City of Lakeland v. Buch, 293 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1974); Ball v. City of Tallahassee, 281 So. 2d
333 (Fla. 1973); Canal Auth. v. Miller, 243 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1970).
249. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
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showing of "public purpose" necessary to justify eminent domain
action. Because the dominant purpose of taking the land was for
private use and because the public necessity of having a parking
garage was merely incidental to the condemnation, the supreme
court reversed the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, and
remanded the action back to the circuit court with instructions to
vacate the order of taking.
Another limitation on the government's eminent domain power
is that "property devoted to a public use cannot be taken and appro-
priated to another and different public use unless the legislative
intent to so take has been manifested in express terms or by neces-
sary implication.""25 This is known as the prior public use doctrine,
and it was the subject of controversy in Florida East Coast Railway
Co. v. City of Miami.25'
The Florida East Coast Railway Co. owned land which it leased
to TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. The lessee operated a marine terminal,
allowing barges carrying truck-trailers from San Juan to dock and
unload. When the City of Miami tried to condemn this land, the
railroad invoked the prior public use doctrine. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, refused to allow the railroad to use the
prior public use doctrine because, inter alia, it was not a "public
body," but merely a "franchised public use company.""25 The Su-
preme Court of Florida disagreed with the validity of that distinc-
tion. It held that if the public use was one which was necessary for
the successful operation of the railroad, the doctrine applied. The
case was remanded to find out if that use of the property was so
needed.
B. Compensation for Injuries to Property Not Taken
Under Florida Statutes section 73.071(3)(b) (1975), a party may
be awarded compensation for the damage to or destruction of a
business of at least five years standing if less than the entire prop-
erty is appropriated. Thus, in Jamesson v. Downtown Development
Authority"' the lessees of a building, which had been condemned
entirely, were denied the right to seek business damages. The court
250. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. City of Miami, 321 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1975).
251. Id.
252. City of Miami v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 286 So. 2d 247, 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
253. 322 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1975).
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noted that the "Florida legislature has chosen not to allow damages
in cases where all of the condemned property has been taken and
the owner has been awarded full compensation." '54
The five year requirement was explained by the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, in Hodges v. Division of Administration,
State Department of Transportation.5 ' There a hotel and marina
had been operated on certain land for fifteen years. The business
was discontinued for five months. Hodges bought the property and
began operating the hotel and marina again. Less than five years
later the property was condemned, and Hodges sought to recover
business damages under the Florida statute."'0 Though refusing to
allow the recovery, the court pointed out that the change in owners
was irrelevant.257 The court denied recovery because it determined
that Hodges had bought only a "business place" and not a going
concern. Since his business was unrelated to the one which had
operated for fifteen years prior to the discontinuance, it was not one
of five years standing.
Where the profitmaking capacity of a business is destroyed, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that compensa-
tion is not limited to lost profits, but includes loss of goodwill."' The
condemnation of property adjacent to and owned by a laundromat
completely destroyed its business. Since the court determined that
compensation could be awarded for lost goodwill, even though the
business might have been losing money, it reversed the circuit
court's exclusion of evidence relating to those damages.
The extent of compensation awarded for damages to property
not taken by the condemnation of other property depends on
whether the loss is substantial. ABS, Inc. owned a shopping center
and land adjacent to it which provided direct access to a neighbor-
ing highway. The State Department of Transportation condemned
part of the adjacent land, forcing shoppers to travel an extra
hundred yards from the highway. When the jury awarded compen-
sation only for the land taken, the circuit court awarded a new trial
because no compensation was awarded for the loss of "direct" ac-
254. Id. at 511.
255. 323 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
256. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1975).
257. The court relied on Hooper v. State Rd. Dep't, 105 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
Actually, during the fifteen years of continuous operation, there had been several owners.
258. Matthews v. Division of Admin., State Dep't of Transp., 324 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1975).
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cess. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed,25
holding that the award did not depend on whether the loss of access
was "direct," but on whether it was "substantial." That being a jury
determination, the verdict was reinstated.
C. Assessing Compensation
In City of Jacksonville v. Yerkes260 the District Court of Appeal,
First District, affirmed the trial court's direction of a verdict for
severance damages where the testimony of an expert witness was
uncontroverted. A property owner relied on that decision in Tuttle
v. Division of Administration, State Department of Transporta-
tion, ' where the taking of property for right of way purposes de-
prived the shopping center owner of parking spaces and resulted
in business losses. The property owner presented a witness who
said that the ghopping center would lose $64,000 if there waB a
seventy percent reduction in its business."' The state's witness re-
ported that the average annual profits were only $12,500, which is
the amount eventually awarded by the jury. Tuttle relied on Yerkes
in arguing that since the $64,000 figure essentially was uncontrov-
erted, the jury should have awarded at least that amount. However,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, did not extend Yerkes
that far and affirmed since there was a rational relationship between
the jury's determination and the evidence.'
The Supreme Court of Florida clarified Yerkes in Behm v. Divi-
sion of Administration, State Department of Transportation.,"4 The
taking of property in front of Behm's hardware store prevented the
display of sales merchandise in front of the store. Behm's expert
witness placed damages at $19,500. Although the state did not pres-
ent a witness offering a contradictory figure, the jury awarded
$9,500. Behm cited Yerkes as requiring a jury award of the mini-
mum amount attested to at the trial. The supreme court disagreed
259. State Dep't of Transp. v. ABS, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
260. 282 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
261. 327 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
262. Tuttle claimed the business would decline seventy percent. Id. at 842.
263. Id. at 843. The court was careful to limit the Yerkes rule to severance damages,
distinguishing such damages from business damages on the basis of burden of proof. While
the question of burden of proof is unsettled with respect to severance damages, it is well
established that the government has no burden to prove damages to business. Hence, only a
rational relationship between the verdict and the evidence is required.
264. 336 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1976).
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and held that any amount introduced by the property owner must
be regarded as a maximum. If the state offered evidence indicating
the value of the loss, it would be considered a minimum. But the
state did not, and is not required to sustain any burden regarding
business losses.
The same day it decided Behm, the supreme court issued a
ruling affirming the First District's decision in Tuttle."' However,
the court noted that it disapproved the decision insofar as it reaf-
firmed Yerkes. 1"
D. Miscellaneous
The trial court's award of interest"7 on compensation for busi-
ness losses to a condemnee was reversed by the District Court of
Appeal, First District, in Division of Administration, Department
of Transportation v. Pink Pussy Cat, Inc. 268 The court held that the
business losses were consequential damages which did not have to
be paid at the time of the taking but only after the damages were
fixed by the jury.
In Pinelas County v. Austin"'6 the landowners sought damages
because of the loss of the right of access to their property. Their
neighbors had requested that the county close a road, causing the
title to that property to revert to them. The county was held liable
for inverse condemnation because its approval was necessary. Since
the plaintiffs were able to show that the loss of access caused special
damages not common to members of the general public, they were
entitled to compensation.
In Askew v. Gables-by-the-Sea, Inc.270 a landowner was held
entitled to require the state to institute condemnation proceedings
through a mandatory injunction. The state had revoked plaintiff's
dredge and fill permit and thus deprived him of the right to use his
land in the only way it could be of any value to him. Rather than
recovering damages, the plaintiff would be awarded just compensa-
tion for the taking.
265. 336 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1976).
266. Id. at 584.
267. See FLA. STAT. § 74.061 (1975).
268. 314 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
269. 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
270. 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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